

COMMUNITY JUSTICE: SIX CHALLENGES

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Community justice refers to a variety of efforts by the criminal justice system to include the community in both crime prevention and criminal sanctioning processes. Community justice may be defined by six core elements: it 1) operates at the local level; 2) is information-driven; 3) entails problem solving; 4) decentralizes authority and accountability; 5) requires citizen participation; and 6) is process-oriented. Each of these may be fundamental features that distinguish community justice models from traditional approaches to crime. However, each also poses significant challenges to implementation. This article examines the six challenges facing a community justice model. © 1999 John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Change is happening in criminal justice and even more broadly across the public policy landscape. Government is no longer seen as the only answer to pressing social problems, yet some form of collective action is clearly necessary. Turning from the state, public policy is increasingly invoking the community. In criminal justice, the prefix is ubiquitous: community crime prevention, community policing, community prosecution, community courts, community corrections, community justice (for a review of these developments, see Karp, 1998). This article examines the role of the community in preventing crime and promoting justice.

DEFINING COMMUNITY JUSTICE

Community justice broadly refers to all variants of crime prevention and justice activities that explicitly include the community in their processes. Community justice is rooted in the actions that citizens, community organizations, and the criminal justice system can

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take to control crime and social disorder. Its central focus is community-level outcomes, shifting the emphasis from individual incidents to systemic patterns, from individual conscience to social mores, and from individual goods to the common good. Typically, community justice is conceived as a partnership between the formal criminal justice system and the community, but often communities autonomously engage in activities that directly or indirectly address crime.

Community justice is not achieved simply by a just response to particular criminal incidents. The shift from traditional to community justice requires a change in purpose from a narrowly conceived agenda of crime control to a broadly determined mission of enhancing the quality of community life. Naturally, crime, fear of crime, and disorder figure prominently in the quality of life, and these remain of the utmost concern. The quality of community life is noted by three factors in particular: the "sense of community" felt by its members (McMillan & Chavis, 1986); the capacity of the community to develop instrumentally and morally competent individuals (Selznick, 1992); and the ability of the community to improve collective outcomes by providing for the general welfare, for example, by ensuring public safety (Bursik, 1988).

Community justice may be identified by six common elements (adapted from Clear & Karp, 1997). These elements distinguish the emerging community justice activities from prior policies and practices. First, there is an explicit attention to the coordination of activities at the local level. Determining the precise boundaries of the community is a problem requiring special attention, but most efforts rely on indigenous definitions of neighborhoods and prioritize the specific, contextual concerns of residents. Second, community justice is information-driven. Using crime report data and citizen surveys, planning and resource allocation is guided by context-specific data. Moreover, these data are used to measure success along a variety of dimensions that more closely approximate local concerns ("measuring what matters"). Third, explicit attention is given to both short and long-term problem-solving. Community justice activities are proactive, based on identified problems. This is a conceptual shift from traditional reactive approaches that address incidents as they occur and without attention to underlying causes. Fourth, community justice practices require decentralization of authority and accountability, which empowers communities and local agencies. In the criminal justice system, organizational changes are necessary to give line workers more decision-making autonomy and facilitate collaboration across law enforcement and social service agencies. Fifth, citizen participation is central. Not only do citizens participate to ensure local concerns are addressed, but such participation is strategic for building community capacity so that informal mechanisms of control can gradually share or replace much of the formal justice apparatus. Sixth, because of the attention to local problems and the active role of citizens, community justice approaches are process-driven, reliant upon broad-based support developed through consensus. This process orientation rejects the imposition of external standards and/or programs on local communities, empowering them to choose their own priorities and methodologies.

While these make the approach unique and each element offers important advantages over alternative approaches, they also create a set of problems that must be reconciled for this model to be effective. The following sections will identify some important problems that follow from each core element.

THE LOCAL AREA AND DEFINING COMMUNITY

Community justice typically emphasizes the local area as the unit of analysis. Without doubt, this engenders an appropriate sense of human proportion to criminal justice ef-

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forts. But, in important ways, this is an unnecessarily narrow focus and belies a reductionistic conception of community. The perennial question is the most basic: what exactly do we mean by community? Three orthogonal dimensions of community ought to be considered with regard to community justice: geography, interdependency, and identity.

The geographic conception of community is rooted in intuitive understandings of community (e.g., the small town) and in the human ecology of the Chicago School. Robert Park, for example, once wrote: "the essential characteristics of a community, so conceived, are those of: 1) a population, territorially organized, 2) more or less completely rooted in the soil it occupies, 3) its individual units living in a relationship of mutual interdependence that is symbiotic rather than societal" (Park, 1936, p.3). From the Chicago perspective, social relations have their origins in physical propinquity: to understand the metropolis, one must examine the "natural areas" that subdivide the city. Guest (1984) associates the natural area concept with two geographically-based factors: length of residence and number of local intimate ties. Much research supports the near association of geographic neighborhood with community. For example, Guest and Lee (1984) found that subjective definitions of community (by residents) are affected by the natural and built environment (also see Taylor, 1988).

These associations are fundamental to concepts of territoriality and surveillance in defensible space theory (Newman, 1972), perceptions of social disorder (Skogan, 1990; Wilson & Kelling, 1982), and the foot and bicycle patrols of community policing (Peak & Glensor, 1996). The geographic conception of community is advantageous to community justice because social relations are often more extensive and intensive with proximity, creating numerous opportunities for the exercise of informal social control. In addition, geography is (obviously) the most easily mapped, facilitating empirical analysis and programmatic efforts to build community. Recent advances in Geographic Information Systems have greatly enhanced the potentiality of data collection at the local level.

Geography has its limits, however. Unlike the early observations of the Chicago School in which economy and geography were closely related (e.g., the concentric zones of Burgess, 1967), the two have become increasingly, though not entirely, detached as a result of technological advancement in communications and transportation (Hawley, 1971). The same can be said of social relations. Social ties—familial, friendship, and otherwise—are now more diffused than concentrated. Wellman and Leighton (1979) argue that community is better described by social networks than by the determinism of space. Their research demonstrates the importance of intimate ties that extend well beyond neighborhood boundary lines.

As a second dimension of community, it is imperative to consider the interdependency of individuals. They never exist in isolation (even when physically separated, behavior follows from socialization and social cognition) and where social ties are sparse in local geography, they are likely to be more intensive elsewhere. Interdependency refers to both affective attachments and material investment. From this perspective, community may be conceived as strong where mutual dependence is high, and weak where individuals are relatively independent. Such interdependence is made concrete in the political economy of a community, but also in its social institutions. To what extent do individuals make use of local institutions? Where do they work, shop, have bank accounts, and invest their civic energy? Who are their friends? Where do they find entertainment, legal advice, educational training? The social networks created through social interactions are often stronger indicators of community than geography.

Since wealth is unevenly distributed across space, looking to the local area alone for evidence of community, and particularly communal obligation, precludes any coordination of resource exchange between rich and poor areas. The social isolation of urban ghettos is more important than their physical location (Wilson, 1987). Nevertheless, suburban residents benefit greatly from the inner city, creating gross inequities as urban residents support services that suburbanites depend upon (Molotch, 1976; Rusk, 1995). Fostering interdependence between the class-divided areas of the metropolis may be the single most important solution to ghetto crime.

Another dimension worthy of consideration is identity. This, too, does not necessarily conform to geography. Identity is a dimension of community that reflects the degree to which members share similar demographic traits: solidarity is based on membership in the same church, race, profession, etc. These status characteristics presuppose common values, attitudes, and beliefs. Communities of identity foster ties across space, illustrated when people from distant locales gather for some common purpose (e.g., the Million Man March). The conflict between geographical and identity-based conceptions of community has been particularly vitriolic recently in the construction and alteration of voting districts. Geography and identity, of course, often overlap such as in the creation of ethnic enclaves. But in these cases it is shared identity that may be the stronger factor in sustaining the community (Firey, 1945; Gans, 1962; Suttles, 1968).

Geography facilitates the workings of interdependency and identity, but the two can operate independently of geography. Interdependency is influential in the exchange dynamic: individuals do not want to risk their investments in long-term social and material relations. These investments create a stake in conformity. Interdependency relations are perhaps best understood within the context of conflict models (Logan & Molotch, 1987) and exchange models (Blau, 1964; Coleman, 1990), which presume conflicts of interest and competitive resolutions to problems of scarce resource distribution. Identity is sometimes expressed in exchange terms, however it is better conceived within the normative, cultural framework of the moral order (Durkheim, 1950). Etzioni (1996), for example, argues that communities often ensure conformity because they hold individuals accountable to the values to which they already subscribe. In this consensus model, shared values are reinforced through voluntaristic, not coercive, social influence.

The three dimensions of community may each be indicators of the level of community, though high marks on all counts would not necessarily be ideal, because such a community may be antithetical to the cosmopolitan ideal "that persons in a given social position have extensive role relations *with others in many different social positions*" (Blau, 1977, p. 96, italics added). This ideal is implied in the German proverb, "breathing city air makes one free" (Lyon, 1987, p. 245). Life in a geographically isolated community where high interdependency poses significant risks of stigmatization and outcasting, and high cultural identity limits the diversity of expression and social change is a life to which few aspire. What, then, would be the ideal relationship of these dimensions?

Although high levels of community on all three dimensions may pose problems, critics of American society usually lament the consequences of very low scores on these indicators. Can they all be raised or can one compensate for another? Generally, community building strategies compensate for a weakness in one dimension by developing the others. Business Improvement Districts (BIDs), for example, increase community identity by making salient shared geography and economic interdependence. They foster new conceptions of communal identity (businesses as active community members), and new normative standards for these actors (businesses have a responsibility for reducing social

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disorder). As another example, Neighborhood Watch programs and citizen patrols make use of identity born of shared concerns for neighborhood safety. This common ground helps overcome the anonymity of communities where individuals neither know or depend on another on a regular basis. However, Skogan (1988, p. 47) observes that, "civilian patrols [are] most common in racially mixed areas of cities. Rather than drawing the community together, preservationist groups in these areas may selectively recruit members on the basis of their values and backgrounds, and their efforts—including crime prevention—may be divisive rather than integrative." Unfortunately, the very strong in-group identification that is sometimes used to get collective action off the ground, may undermine the larger goals of community building and public safety when the strategy also invokes racial discord. How can such identity-enhancing strategies overcome the tendency towards intergroup conflict?

There are good practical and historical reasons that will keep the concept of community tied closely to geography. But community justice can also explore and develop the other dimensions of community. Communities, bound simply by geography, can easily become isolationist by their own design or be cordoned off from the resources and opportunities of their neighbors. Just as individuals are best understood as embedded within a larger social framework, so communities should be understood by the networks that extend beyond geographic boundaries. The cross-cutting allegiances of community members to several geographic and non-geographic communities (Etzioni, 1996) and the nesting of communal identifications within ever larger frameworks (Hunter & Suttles, 1972) provides a context for responsive relations across social, as well as physical, space.

INFORMATION OVERLOAD

Community justice is an information-driven, multi-dimensional approach to crime. It is not simply concerned with crime rates, but with fear, disorder, relations between criminal justice professionals and community members, and the correlates of crime. As such, complex models underlie programmatic solutions. However, this complexity is rarely specified and projects often proceed on the basis of intuition and incomplete data. Two issues are emblematic of this problem. First, the number of problems to be solved by community justice participants are exponentially greater than the number associated with traditional approaches. How to identify and prioritize these problems are basic, but difficult tasks. Second, as professionals attempt to solve newly defined problems, they must try new solutions that require information-gathering and networking. These tasks often blur the boundaries between law enforcement and social welfare, forcing practitioners to assume new social roles. This creates role confusion for individuals and turf battles between agencies (Sadd & Grinc, 1996). The source of these problems is in a new expectation that line workers gather information and take initiative in problem-solving. How that information is gathered, how it is used, and who uses it are central problems for community justice.

Criminal justice practitioners often complain about net-widening: sentencing of a wider array of offenses. Typically, this is viewed as a function of retributive demand. However, net-widening may also be associated with the number of problems that can be addressed beyond the traditional mandates. New efforts in crime prevention are considering the linkages between crime and other social and environmental problems, such as mental health, poverty, disorder, and situational opportunities. Police officers are asked

not simply to respond, but to identify recurrent problems and proactively address them (Goldstein, 1990). New court subdivisions (e.g., community, drug, juvenile) are meant to better address the specific problems of special populations (Anderson, 1996). Restorative justice is predicated on repairing damage done to victims and communities (Bazemore & Umbreit, 1995). Violent crime may be reduced by targeting subway fare-busters (Kelling & Coles, 1996). Clarke and Mayhew (1988) even observe that suicide in Britain was reduced by a change in the gas supply. There is no shortage of possible problems to address and pursuing some of the non-obvious links is consistent with the philosophy of community justice, but it results in an increase in the number of problems to be solved as the net gets wider.

Community policing, where problem-solving has been widely implemented, provides an illustration of how this approach is innovative, but this new approach raises its own questions. Consider the contrast between traditional and problem-solving approaches provided by Peak and Glensor (1996, p. 95):

Police had experienced a series of disturbances in a relatively quiet and previously stable residential neighborhood. Although the neighborhood's zoning had for years provided for late-night cabaret-style businesses, none had existed until the "Nite Life," a live-music dance club, opened. Within a few weeks the police dispatcher received an increased number of complaints about loud music and voices, fighting, and screeching tires late into the night. Within a month's time, no fewer than 50 calls for service had been dispatched to the club to restore order. Evening-shift officers responded to calls and restored order prior to midnight but graveyard shift officers would again have to restore order when called back to the scene by complaining neighbors after midnight.

Rather than simply responding to calls, community police officers took a problem-solving approach. Data analysis provided evidence that calls-for-service increased dramatically in the area as a result of the club's opening. Officers learned that realtors had complained to the city council about newfound difficulties in selling houses in the neighborhood. Neighboring businesses had contacted the municipality regarding an increase in litter found each morning. Information was gathered concerning possible zoning and health department violations. The officers discovered the landlord, who owned the club's building and several adjacent buildings, had plans to renovate within the next few years. Calls-for-service declined after the officers implemented an approach that took account of these issues:

The landlord agreed to hasten landscaping and lighting of the parking lots and provide a "sound wall" around the business to buffer the noise heard by the area residents. Agreements were reached to limit the hours of operation of the live music. The cabaret's owner and all of his employees were trained by the area patrol teams in pertinent aspects of the city code (such as disturbing the peace, minors in liquor establishments, and trespassing laws). The landlord, meeting with all of his other business tenants, agreed to a prior review of any future long-term lease agreements with the cabaret to make certain that it was appropriate to continue such a business in the center.

Although this example demonstrates how community policing can be problem-solving, the approach raises several questions. Can police do all things? How many night-clubs, abandoned vehicles, and broken windows are there? Can the responsibility for

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problem-solving be delegated to local community groups rather than relying on police and other criminal justice professionals to do the work? Given the huge volume of problems that could be solved, will this approach raise undue expectations among the community that all problems will be solved in a timely manner? Which problems should be considered? What criteria would be used to prioritize problems? Are there systematic analyses for triage—is there a fair allocation mechanism to prevent better-connected individuals and communities from having minor problems solved before others get major problems solved? Do the neediest or most disenfranchised get the least attention? What institutional linkages (e.g., between various social service agencies) are necessary to facilitate problem-solving?

The reactive approach is easy in terms of knowing what to address, even if it is ultimately unsuccessful. Putting out fires is easier than identifying faulty wiring or potential arsonists before the fires occur. Yet community approaches push toward prevention, blurring the boundaries of criminal justice with other social welfare agencies. This often causes role confusion among practitioners. At the same time, community justice invokes new obligations and expectations of members of the community. This is not just true for private citizens, but for corporate actors, who, for example, have taken a larger role by investing in private security and creating BIDs.

Community police officers have to reconcile emerging role identities with their traditional "tough guy" image. As tough guys, it was enough to self-identify as "Marines" capable of descending into dangerous, often violent situations. The capacity to reduce conflict quickly through non-violent or violent means took precedence. New identities are now being incorporated by such officers. First, officers are becoming social workers. Here they must be able to follow up on incidents while carefully managing the emotions of offenders and victims. They need to be both investigative and comforting. Moreover, they are compelled to sustain contact with victims as they try to develop a complex understanding of the case. Second, officers need to be community activists and educators, working with community members to solve enduring, often disorder-related problems. This requires skills in outreach, leadership, networking, and organization. Third, they are becoming community members. With a long-term assignment to a neighborhood, they are likely to develop their own stake in the neighborhood's future, compelling them to exert normative influence in addition to law enforcement. Does it make sense to have one officer fulfill all of these disparate roles? To what extent are these identities incompatible? What are the parameters that establish success in these endeavors? As police create new role identities, how does this affect the roles of other social service providers and of community members?

Community justice is a creative alternative to traditional practices. As such, it is clearly in an experimental phase. Over time, strategies of data collection, identification and application of successful solutions, and coordination of responsibility will become routinized. At present, however, the emphasis on data garnered from sophisticated technologies and community surveys requires procedures for prioritization. Without this, practitioners may easily become overwhelmed and ineffectual, ultimately frustrating and disappointing community members. Responsiveness to these data also invokes new role identities, potentially creating confusion over delegated and, often contradictory, responsibilities.

PROBLEM-SOLVING AND SOCIAL INEQUALITY

Community justice explicitly rejects the "911" paradigm of reactivity. Even with information overload, problem-solvers quickly arrive at one antecedent cause that requires

change beyond the capacity of a single community: social inequality. This is most pronounced when addressing crime in the inner-city.

Communities are variously affected by macro-level forces that impact their vulnerability to crime. Sampson and Wilson (1998, p. 98) argue that "macrosocial patterns of residential inequality give rise to the social isolation and ecological concentration of the truly disadvantaged, which in turn leads to structural barriers and cultural adaptations that undermine social organization and hence the control of crime." Social inequality poses a special problem for community justice. Is it important to address the structural correlates of crime? Can communities successfully address social inequalities?

When Wilson (1987) introduced the concept of concentrated poverty, he argued that high levels of crime in communities cannot be associated simply with overall poverty levels, but with how poverty is distributed geographically. The impact of poverty for an individual is significantly different if she or he lives among people who are equally poor or among people who are much better off. Concentrated poverty areas have the highest levels of joblessness, single-parent households, welfare dependency, and crime. In these areas, criminal opportunities abound (e.g., convenience stores, open-air drug markets), young males are often unemployed, truant, or unsupervised, and local institutions that facilitate social control are weak and/or relatively sparse (e.g., voluntary organizations, churches, schools, locally-owned businesses, municipal services). Socially disorganized areas are defined by their inability to exert social controls and fulfill collective objectives (Bursik, 1988). Individuals, even poor or unemployed, living in a non-poverty area are confronted with a very different normative environment that challenges them to adopt the standards of behavior consistent with a working, law-abiding existence. This normative contrast is closely related to important structural differences: economic and social opportunities exist for these people as a consequence of local networks that do not exist for the poor living in a concentrated poverty area.

Perhaps the most important structural factors are urban change and segregation. Urban change refers to the loss of blue-collar jobs in major cities over the last three decades, severely limiting the employment opportunities for less-educated, urban workers. Segregation refers to the creation and maintenance of black urban ghettos and provides one explanation for the disproportionate association of street crime with blacks, particularly young, urban males. In essence, there is no other racial or ethnic group that has been as affected by both urban change and segregation. As Massey and Denton (1993, p. 114) have demonstrated, "blacks remain the most spatially isolated population in U.S. history." Moreover, Sampson and Wilson (1998, p. 102) note, "the 'worst' urban contexts in which whites reside are considerably better than the average context of black communities."

American cities have changed in the last few decades from being places of production and distribution of goods to centers of administration, finance, and information (Kasarda, 1989). As a result, blue-collar jobs, which once constituted the primary occupational category in the central city, have declined while education-intensive white-collar jobs have increased. These blue-collar jobs had been a traditional avenue of employment for urban blacks because they were relatively well-paid, stable, and did not require high levels of education. While educational levels of blacks have risen over time, the changes have not offset the impact of urban industrial change. Although the largest proportion of urban blacks are employed in low-education jobs, it is high-education jobs that have demonstrated the highest growth in the city. As a result of these changes, many blacks are jobless while many others are marginally employed in service industries that do not provide the income or stability of their blue-collar predecessors.

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Historically, segregation has been a policy and practice of discrimination. When the inequalities associated with segregation practices could no longer be discounted, its official support receded. Yet, blacks remain the most highly segregated group in America (Massey & Denton, 1993). Inner-city public schools are substantially inferior to their suburban neighbors (Kozol, 1991). Although surveys demonstrate that many whites prefer not to live near blacks, blacks prefer integration (Farley et al., 1978), suggesting that blacks are not explicitly choosing to self-segregate. Policies that locate public housing in black neighborhoods not only increase poverty concentration, but help maintain residential segregation. Widespread housing discrimination (Massey & Denton, 1993) and suburban employment discrimination (Wilson, 1996) prevent many blacks from moving away from urban ghettos. Nevertheless, many blacks do manage to escape ghetto life. Unfortunately, these tend to be the better educated and professionally employed. Thus, middle-class black out-migration further concentrates poverty and increases the social isolation of ghetto residents (Wilson, 1987).

Poverty concentration and black urban segregation have burdened inner-city communities with extremely high crime rates. Can communities successfully address these problems? What extra-local resources or political support is necessary for such efforts? Communities have pursued various strategies to directly confront the problems of poverty concentration and segregation, usually by attempting to improve the economic conditions of the segregated ghetto: improvements in education, school-to-work programs, job-training, "Empowerment Zones/Enterprise Communities," commercial development corporations, civil enforcement of housing laws, "seed" components of "weed and seed" programs, and various other comprehensive community development programs. These strategies also attempt to deconcentrate poverty and desegregate through relocation of public housing and voucher programs, school busing and magnet school programs, redesign of public transit systems to facilitate travel to suburban work locations, and enforcement of fair housing laws. Some evidence demonstrates the effectiveness of such relocation for success in the labor market and in educational attainment (Rusk, 1995). However beneficial, programmatic attempts to relocate low-income blacks into non-poverty areas usually meet great resistance.

What is obvious from this analysis is the disjunction between white suburbs and black urban ghettos. Rusk (1995) argues that little will change unless cities are reorganized into metropolitan governments facilitating the linkage between these distant worlds. Are metropolitan governments more successful in addressing poverty concentration? Is this the only vehicle for change? Buerger (1998) creatively suggests the formation of sister neighborhoods in which economically distant communities join forces at the local level. How could such a proposal be implemented? Community justice is not likely to succeed unless these broader structural issues are addressed. Rarely, however, do communities organize with the expressed purpose of deconcentrating poverty. This would require inter-community efforts in the face of political challenges to their implementation, and would force community advocates to expand their horizons beyond geographically narrow conceptions of community in order to foster greater interdependence between urban and suburban areas.

DECENTRALIZATION AND INFORMAL SOCIAL CONTROL

When power is transferred from government to community, problems may occur at two margins. At one margin, there is the problem of mobilization; when the community fails

to take responsibility for the problems it is to solve (the next section discusses this). At the other margin, communities may take full responsibility but, in a sense, do too much. It is possible that communities will use means that conflict with broader values of the culture, for example, vigilantism or discrimination. When power is informal, how may actors (and communities) be held accountable? This problem is especially acute for autonomous community crime prevention efforts because they lack the formal oversight of criminal justice agencies.

In New Haven, CT, a late 1980s police crackdown on prostitution in the city's well-known red light district had the unfortunate effect of displacing the sex trade to the surrounding residential neighborhoods. One of these was Edgewood Park, a racially and economically heterogeneous neighborhood. There, prostitutes began their work in Edgewood early in the morning, targeting those heading to work, and continued through the day and into the night. Used condoms littered the playgrounds, schoolkids waited for buses adjacent to prostitutes waiting for johns. In response, community members organized a campaign to reduce prostitution (Bass, 1992).

When neighbors saw a car circling a block 25 to 30 times or picking up a prostitute, they would take down the license plate number and trace the registration through the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). They quickly discovered most johns were not from Edgewood Park but came from other neighborhoods. They sent a letter to the car owner's address advising the owner that the car had been seen "cruising" the neighborhood. The letter detailed the community's campaign against prostitution and urged the recipient to be careful about whom they lent the car to in the future. In this case, they were somewhat circumspect about directing blame. On the home front, however, the group posted flyers, noting the "john of the week," reprinting the john's name, address, and phone number, based on the information obtained from the DMV. After some johns complained they were receiving anonymous, threatening phone calls, the group stopped including phone numbers on the flyers.

Although no formal study has been conducted, Edgewood's campaign appears to have worked. Daytime prostitution apparently disappeared after the campaign was initiated, and three years after the campaign began, prostitution was "basically gone from the area" (Winokur, 1995). However successful, some have questioned the legitimacy of the approach. Lawsuits were filed by some johns against the members of the neighborhood association for harassment. In one case, the alleged john claimed his wife received the letter and left him. The plaintiff's attorney argued, "The harassment statute is certainly violated. They are inflicting wanton pain on people they know to be innocent in order to achieve what they consider a larger goal. I think that's a pretty fair definition of terrorism." Of course, the campaign leader disagreed: "The guy is patronizing a prostitute in my neighborhood. It's affecting my property value. What's the cause of his current problem? Visiting a prostitute in the first place, or having his wife find out about it?" (Bass, 1992). Though several cases were filed, all were dismissed.

The Edgewood Neighborhood Association campaign is an example of informal control because the letters and flyers brought the johns' behavior to the attention of family members and the larger community. The threat was not of formal sanctioning, but of communal status loss. The marital break-up and harassment suits demonstrate its impact on the targeted individuals. This community action raises important questions regarding the application of informal control.

First, what should be the relationship between the community and the formal justice system? The Edgewood group operated completely autonomously. Obviously, this

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distance from a formal institution has implications for oversight. In other situations, autonomous community groups have been charged with racism (Skogan, 1988) and vigilantism (Weisburd, 1988). For example, all-Jewish citizen patrols in Brooklyn's Crown Heights have been known to target blacks, in some cases, exercising summary justice on the street (Mitchell, 1992). Also, when community members involve themselves directly with criminals, they are placing themselves at risk, probably without the necessary preparation. What, if any, situations are inappropriate for citizen groups to handle? As yet, there are no clearly delineated roles for community members.

Second, is this a viable method of sanctioning and deterrence? One of the intriguing decision points for the Edgewood Association involved determining where the flyers would be posted: only in Edgewood, or also near the residence of the targeted johns, who tended not to be locals? They believed that the impact would be stronger if they posted in both areas. In the end, they decided not to post flyers in johns' neighborhoods because they believed this to be overly punitive. The difference was subtle, but important. Flyers in Edgewood were designed to be deterrents more than sanctions because they would be seen by other johns rather than by neighbors of the target. Flyers posted so that the johns' family and neighbors would see them were a significantly stronger exercise of informal sanctioning, perhaps effective as a special deterrent, but probably little general deterrent power since johns came from so many different areas. The role of the community is often conceived in all or nothing terms: they should or should not be involved in law enforcement. A far more sophisticated analysis is necessary to examine levels of involvement based on various characteristics of the situation (e.g., type of crime, risk, community capacity, etc.) and the types of sanctioning used. Part of the concern is uncertainty over the effects of normative sanctions. Days in jail are quantifiable, but the impact of a "Dear John" letter is unknown.

Third, to what extent does a community effort represent the entire community? Informal actions by the Edgewood Association were undertaken on behalf of the community. To what extent are they consistent with local normative standards? By definition, community actions are designed to tighten local standards and increase their enforcement. Community members are thereby claiming that what was once acceptable is no longer acceptable. But did they go through some democratic process that enabled community members to clarify their standards and identify appropriate methods of normative enforcement?

Fourth, are the rights of alleged offenders being violated? Clearly, this campaign targeted individuals who were not formally convicted of any offense. Yet they were definitely sanctioned. There was no due process, no opportunity to profess innocence, no opportunity to contest the community's norms. It was certainly possible that a misread license plate would lead to the targeting of innocent people. Police need more justification than circling the neighborhood to arrest a john: should community groups be held to a lesser standard? What other protections are necessary to protect the innocent from informal sanctions by the community? Clearly, the presence of guiding local institutions with their own systems of accountability can help. The Edgewood Neighborhood Association depended primarily upon a local law firm and the leadership of an Orthodox Jewish congregation for its guidance.

The criminal justice system has its formal power fairly consolidated and has traditionally emphasized a procedural model to ensure fairness. Community justice advocates decentralization of this power, in part to increase the system's legitimacy in the eyes of the public, but more importantly to increase the effectiveness of local level collective ac-

tion. In so doing, community justice raises the specter of Montana militias and Ku Klux Klans. Community justice has yet to specify the framework for a community's accountability to broader standards of the culture.

CITIZEN PARTICIPATION: IMMOBILIZED AND UNDER-REPRESENTED

The mantra of practitioners interested in community justice seems to be: "We can't do it alone." When the responsibility for social control is shared with the community, we can be concerned about the community doing too much, exceeding the limits of their authority and contradicting overarching values. At the other extreme, it is possible, if not more likely, that the community will not fulfill its expected potential. What if the community fails to take responsibility and ends up doing less than government? In effect, what do we do when the community is invited but no one shows up? Moreover, how do we ensure that community groups and community leaders are fairly representing the "true" interests or, at least, the diversity of interests of the community?

Simply put, "generating and maintaining participation is one of the major implementation difficulties for community crime prevention programs" (Bennett, 1998, p. 32). How will we get the community to play an active role? Crime control is a public good. In principle, we would like to reduce crime rather than increase it, but we would also like to reduce the costs (time, effort, money) of fighting crime rather than increase them. The best strategy for individuals is, therefore, to free ride on the crime prevention efforts of others. Unfortunately, when we all depend on others to do the work, nothing gets done. Self-interest overwhelms the public good. The fundamental question is: How can we get people to participate in crime control activities when it is not in their immediate self-interest to do so?

People differ in their levels of trust, social values, and personal tastes. Some will be rallied by their optimism, while some may hesitate, perhaps because of the overly optimistic propaganda of previous campaigns. Underlying this difference is uncertainty over the effectiveness of the effort. People will not join unless they are assured some probability of success, especially given the risks of participation. Safety in numbers is especially important when considering levels of distrust between many community members and police, and when considering the risks of collective action, such as retaliation by drug dealers (Grinc, 1998).

Many will join out of a deep sense of commitment to the community. Here effectiveness is less important than the goal. Knowing that the cause is just is motivation enough. Some simply find participation interesting and enjoyable. For these people, it is less the goal or the assurance of success, but the attractiveness of the means that inspires participation (Goldsmith-Hirsch, 1998; Skogan, 1988). Olson (1965) argued that collective action was unlikely unless participation offered something otherwise compelling in addition to the desired collective benefit. Consider the comment by one of Orange Hat citizen patrol members of Washington, D.C.: "We enjoy it," says Patty Walker. "We may complain, oh it's cold out here or hot out here or I'm bored or I'd rather be doing something else, but I do think that we enjoy it. You talk, you see what's going on. In the course of all these years you've gotten to find out names and locations of everyone's children or grandchildren, how they're doing in school, where they're going to school. Things like that" (Goldsmith-Hirsch, 1998, p. 53).

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Mobilization is not simply dependent upon individual characteristics. In addition to trust, values, and tastes, the objective conditions under which collective action takes place may inspire or undermine it.

Some collective efforts require enormous effort and provide little return. Davis and Lurigio (1996) have observed that anti-drug campaigns of the late 1980s and 1990s have been far more successful than other earlier crime prevention campaigns. This may be because drug sales take place in stable, visible settings whereas burglaries and robberies, for example, can occur anywhere. Community surveillance is considerably easier in anti-drug efforts because the targets are easily found. The Orange Hats, for instance, have targeted one street corner as the focal point of their efforts (Goldsmith-Hirsch, 1998). Conducting cost/benefit analyses may resolve long-standing arguments about the likelihood of certain income groups to participate in crime prevention campaigns. Some have argued that those who need to organize the most are the least likely to do so (Dubow & Podowleski, 1982; Skogan, 1988). Yet anti-drug efforts in disorganized communities do seem to occur when the potential benefits and the efficiency of crime prevention efforts sufficiently outweigh the costs.

Some communities are better organized than others at the outset. They have strong local institutions (schools, churches, civic associations, etc.) and viable communication networks that quickly spread the word that a community campaign is underway. The predecessor to the Orange Hats Patrol, for example, was a Neighborhood Watch program organized in conjunction with the police, and this effort created a local network with a block captain (Goldsmith-Hirsch, 1998). Community capacity is often dependent upon the social organization of communities (Chavis, Speer, Resnick, & Zippay, 1993). To what extent do poverty, inequality, mobility, heterogeneity, urban density, family disruption and other macro-level variables have an effect on the stake an individual has in the community? And to what extent does this stake, in turn, affect mobilization? Owners, for example, are more likely to be mobilized than renters (Skogan, 1988). Thus, the ratio of owners to renters and other such macro-level characteristics may be important predictors of mobilization.

Even when mobilization is successful, it is important to consider who is being mobilized. Grinc's (1998) evaluation of a community policing program implies that many individuals and interests are typically underrepresented in crime prevention efforts. This may be a result of fear of retaliation by offenders or the historically poor relationship between the community and the police. It may result from perceptions of low efficacy, in part because community members do not have clearly defined roles with regard to crime prevention and in part because of experience with prior, failed collective actions. Underrepresentation may also result from both intergroup tension, manifest in the homogeneous and competitive organization of local groups in heterogeneous communities (Skogan, 1988), and in intragroup conflicts that arise between leaders and group members (Grinc, 1998).

In collaborations between law enforcement agencies and private citizens or community organizations, community agendas are often sidelined because of the clear power imbalances. Crawford (1995, p. 114) argues that community representatives do not have the cultural capital (Bourdieu, 1977) to compete with their formal partners: "The resources, both human and material, available to the different agencies, their appeals to 'expertise' and their grasp of the technicist language in which much debate is couched leaves the community representatives in a relatively powerless position." As such, various interests are excluded even in ostensibly democratic participation efforts. This may occur because of informal and biased leadership/advisory position selection processes that

systematically exclude problematic individuals, groups, or perspectives. The result is not simply a violation of democratic values, but a failure to meet the needs of disadvantaged and marginalized groups. Crime displacement, particularly within the context of public policies and social processes that concentrate poverty in urban, minority areas, may occur from organized to disorganized areas.

Berry, Portney, and Thomson's (1993) study of citizen participation at the city level indicates that it is possible to garner significant and representative participation, but this may only be possible with city-wide commitment to strong democracy. This would involve the decentralization of power to the citizen participation structures (including discretionary funding), incentives for structural change in city administrations, and clearly-defined, non-partisan, neighborhood associations that recruit citizens at the local level. Such efforts may reduce the informality and bias of current, piecemeal efforts in mobilizing and equitably representing communities.

EVALUATING PROCESS AND PRODUCT

Community justice is process-driven. It is inclusive and responsive with regard to defining and prioritizing local problems, and flexible in its methods of approach. Crime reduction remains the unchanged goal; the approach, however, is new. The problem-solving, citizen-inclusive orientation embodies the promise of democratic action, but also creates new challenges, particularly with regard to evaluation.

The National Crime Prevention Council recently published a volume entitled *350 Tested Strategies to Prevent Crime* (NCPC, 1995). This volume contains many creative ideas for collective action. But by what criteria are these strategies "tested"? It seems the standards of evaluation vary considerably with regard to community crime prevention programs. For instance, Rosenbaum (1988, p. 375) observed that, "As for collective anti-crime programs, nearly one hundred reports indicate that Neighborhood Watch reduces crime, but a closer look uncovers a curious inverse relationship: the stronger the research design, the weaker the program effects observed." There are two ways to look at this sobering comment. One is the direct implication that better evaluations will demonstrate community actions are ineffective. In this light, we must look at the popular publications with appropriate skepticism and an understanding that the language of social science is often appropriated for marketing purposes. This is a thorny problem, but there is a more fundamental issue to be raised here: the need to include community process in program designs and evaluation.

Much of community justice practice has been disconnected from research, particularly with regard to evaluation and generalization. We must ask how communities may be involved in a way that enhances our understanding of successes and failures, so that these communities and others can learn from them. In principle, of course, no one is against strategies to identify what works best. In practice, however, this rarely happens and it is important to consider why. I will advance only one issue here, following closely the recent insights of Bennett (1998). Essentially, she argues that stronger research designs identify fewer successes not because they more accurately reflect reality, but because they fail to identify important organizational successes and often impose constraints that undermine the effectiveness of the community organizations in achieving their goals.

Since Bales' (1950) pioneering work on group dynamics, the tension between process and product has been seen as central to group functioning. Evaluations of community-level efforts to prevent crime tend to emphasize the product orientation without much

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regard to process. Bringing process back into the evaluation of community justice efforts is essential to understanding collective actions for crime prevention. Where the ideals of evaluation research conflict with the ideals of community organizing, we are likely to find either unsatisfactory designs with strong results or good designs with weak results.

Evaluators favor clearly defined, rationally conceived, data-driven program designs, and implementation that carefully proceeds according to plan. Pre-designed programs are favored because these details are worked out ahead of time. Though an evaluator's dream, such programs may be derailed because they fail to consider local problems and citizen preferences of approach. Without explicit attention to the process of community inclusion in decision-making, such programs often undermine the opportunity for consensus formation which undergirds mobilization. In contrast, process-driven designs may explicitly avoid clearly stated goals and means in order to maximize consensus amidst diversity of opinion. Moreover, process-driven designs are likely to be quite flexible, changing course in response to changing local conditions: from bad weather to the emergence of new problems to the sudden availability of resources. Consider the example raised by Bennett (1998, p. 37):

One community organization, for instance, originally targeted underage drinking in local parks in its antidrug work plan. By the time the work plan was approved and the program started, fall had arrived and residents were no longer concerned about drinking in the parks. This issue was replaced with others of more immediate importance, and by the next spring, residents' concerns about youth activities had evolved beyond park drinking.

A second contrast between product and process is illuminated by evaluators' needs for decontextualized programs with clear beginnings, middles, and ends, constructed as if the community did not exist before and will not after. Communities will continue to exist and will, therefore, build into program designs goals that are only indirectly related to the identified problem, but directly affect the community's ability to organize in the future. Evaluators would prefer the community to exert all of its influence in the resolution of the immediate problem, exercising its power to the fullest extent in order to maximize the effect on the dependent variable. Communities, however, often need to reserve (and accumulate) some of their power. For example, some time is dedicated to leadership development and to building relationships between local organizations. A single product focus that fails to attend to these long-term needs may undermine organizational capacity when narrow interests compete in zero-sum games.

Evaluators love a paper trail. Data needs organization, and organization requires bureaucracy. Organizations typically need more resources than their members can provide and this also requires bureaucracy. However, formalization generally distances organizations from their membership. Bennett (1998, p. 39) notes that,

One community organization, for example, needed to develop collaborative relationships with city and state agencies to work on its goals of increasing employment and housing opportunities. This focus reduced its contacts within the neighborhoods, alienating at least some of the members and reducing attendance at the organization's annual meeting.

The prerequisites for traditional program evaluation fail to account for the social learning process that is vital to the long-term success of community organizations. Their

process orientation requires flexible designs that change as the organization becomes skilled at mobilizing participants, collaborating with other organizations and agencies, and developing new strategies to deal with new problem definitions. Imposing stringent requirements for the conduct of evaluations may undermine the social learning process of the community organization and reduce its effectiveness in dealing with local problems.

How to reconcile the requirements of proper evaluation and the process needs of organizations is not straightforward. First, it may be that evaluations are too narrow in their scope. Including process indicators in their designs adds to the list of measurable variables without discounting product variables. Sometimes this is done to boast success when the products are poor, but the intent here is to recognize the inevitability of process and account for it accordingly. Second, it may be that the failure to explicitly acknowledge process undermines product outcomes because programs with a product evaluation bias may short-circuit the social learning process. How programs can be evaluated without undermining process is an enormous challenge for community justice.

CONCLUSION

This article has tried to identify the important elements of community justice and important problems raised by community justice. Community justice represents a paradigm shift in that it questions several underlying assumptions of traditional criminal justice practices. It is a response to reactive criminal justice: policing that relies on calls-for-service, courts that process offenders like so many widgets on a conveyer belt, and corrections that warehouse and then release offenders with little attention to community reintegration. Community justice differs from individualistic models of justice that conceive of crime as simply an offense against the state, narrowly determining the offender and the state as the sole interested parties. Instead, community justice embraces a conception of the individual as embedded within a framework of communal relations, influenced by and accountable to the community as much as (if not far more than) it is by and to the state. Community justice is an exercise in community-building. It is explicitly concerned with the collective welfare of the community, thus prevention, quality-of-life issues, and crime fears are not discounted as they have been in the past.

Above all, community justice is a philosophical perspective that explicitly tries to balance the dual societal needs of protecting individual autonomy and providing social order. Inevitably, community justice will be criticized for jeopardizing the protection of rights as it seeks to promote the common good (e.g., Kelling & Coles, 1996). Braithwaite (1989) follows in the liberal tradition that argues criminal justice intrusion into private worlds is legitimated when individuals cause harm to others and when the intrusion treats the offender with dignity rather than stigma. In this regard, he argues, "the good society is intolerant of deviance from the core consensus values, and tolerant, nay encouraging, of diversity beyond the limitations set by those core values. Among the core values that the good society will not tolerate being undermined are the criminal law, and freedom and diversity outside the criminal law" (Braithwaite, 1989, p. 184). With this injunction in mind, community justice may very well provide justice to victims, offenders, and communities in terms that citizens value and comprehend and in a manner that does not jeopardize the essential autonomy granted to individuals in a free, democratic society.

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